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INTRODUCTION 
Expenditures  on  federal environmental,  health and safety regulafio~ 
have grown d,ua~ntically  in recent decades  and now total  several hundred 
Robex,  t W. llahn is the Director of the AI~-I~  Jolnt Crater fro" R~ry 
Studies, a p.,,~'dm'd Scholm"  at the American Eatel~  In.~mt.~  and a P~*ch  Associate 
at  Ha~exd l.,Snive~si  W. ~  Holden, ~  Yoko~ and l;3i,~heth  Cooper ~  a.~- 
ble and emly'ze the data fm tiffs pep~.  The helpful c~'mments of Iason Bumett,  Chns De- 
Muth, Robell Litan md Patnsa Moyle are gratefully acknowledged.  The views in this paper 
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which he is affiliated. 
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bilfion dollars ununally.  ~  Over the next decade, regulations and regulatory 
expenditures are likely to increase significantly.  As regulatory activities 
grow, so does the need to consider their implications more ~fully.  Yet, 
the economic impacts of regulatiun receive mum less sen~'~m  direct, 
budgeted government spending. 
The potential gains of regulatory reform are substantial.  P~search sug- 
gests that a  substantial number of the  federal government's regulations 
would fail a  strict benefit-cost test using the government's own numbers.  2 
Moreover, there is mnple research suggesting that regulation could be sig- 
nificantly improved,  so  th~  we  could  save  more  lives  with  fewer  re- 
sources.  3  One study found that a  reallocation of mandated expenditures 
toward those regulations with the highest payoff to society could save as 
many as 60,000 more lives a year at no additional cost.* 
Congress has recently become more receptive to using economic analy- 
sis ~  regulato  R  decisienmaking.  For example, the Unfunded Mandates 
Refonn Act of 19955 calls for economic assessmems of government man- 
dates affecting state governments, local governments and the private sector. 
Another example is an amendment that requires the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) to produce a report un the benefits and costs of federal 
reg~dntlon,  e  While these assessments am important, morn needs to be done 
• 1.  See KI~'~TH J. Am~w ~-T AL., By-.~,l-CmT At~LYsm IN Ex~m~x~mm~'r~., 
I'mAL~t, ~u~ 8.e'~rv RrmULATIC~:  A STATe~u~rr  OF ~  (1996);  SSe a/so Ol~ncg 
OF I~ANA~  AND BLq~KT. OFFICK  OF ]]~'ORI~Lq~ AND P,.I~GULA'IURy  AFFAE~,9, 
l~u~xT "to Co~c.xsss c~ l~x Cos~ ~,a) BxNm'~ oF ~  P,  zc,  m~.r.~,= ( 19~ (~ 
itat June 29, 200O)  <h~:/~vww.whitoho,.~ gov/OMB~'orq~co~ 
Ol~cx  c~ I~YCe.UArX)N  xm) RSC~.~OXy A~XU~ 1997]. 
2.  In thc mo~ Iikc~ scmmio, Hm'm found that 60 out of 106 resuintimL%  or 57%, 
would not pass a stn~ benefit--c¢~  test. See Ku.eatT W. ~  ~'rcay 
As~ssI~O ~  ~s  N~  14 (*~]~l][~Nki~!  Jomt ~r.  fo~ ]~gU~ll~ 
Stu~es Werkin~ Paper No. 99-6, 1999). 
3.  See John F. Mort'all  HI, A Rewew ofth~ Record, 10 Rr=o.  25, 29-34 (1986) (dis. 
cu.~in~ cos1 effectiveness  of rules); see also W. IC~ ~fiscasi, The Dangers of Unbounded 
Commitments to Regulate Rig, in RINKS, Cos'rs, AND LlWS SAVED 135, 162 (Robert W. 
p.~h. ed., 1996)  (concluding  that reallocatinn of  regulatory  resomces  would save more lives 
for less money). 
4.  See Tanuny O. Te~ga & John D. Gr~  The Op~ty  Costs of Haphamvd 
Social Investments in Life-S~ng, in Rugs, Co.v~, Arm  Llws SA'V'~D  167, 172 (Robezt W. 
Hahn ed.,1996) (find!rig  that ch~nses in investment strategy could save twice as me~y fives 
as tmdor c~,,~,; legislation). 
5.  Pub.L.No. 104-4, 109Stat.48(codifiedinscatXeredsestioasof2U.S.C.). 
6.  See ~  oF L'~o~'~oN  AND ~'IORY  A~AmS  1997, supra note  1 (ex- 
pisiumg that obligation of OMB to submit detailed repert~ to Congress is indicative of 
agreeme~ that gathering inch information  would improve  reg,,l~-y reform); see a/so Om- 
m'bas Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L  No. 104-208, § 645,  il0 Stat. 2000]  REGULATORF  ACCOONTABILITY  929 
to hold legislators accountable for the regulations that are implemented.  7 
To improve regulation, an important first step is to provide usefifl infor- 
mation that is accessible to the public aad other interested parties.  The 
government is an essential  source of that information for many federal 
legulations.  Within the government, a central  repositow of information on 
regulation is the Federal Register. 
This paper examines how the Federal Register can be used to improve 
the regulatory process by providing information to interested parties in a 
"user-friendly" format.  The Federal Register is the focus of this ana!ysis 
because it provides the text of all  federal regulations and sometimes pro- 
vides summaries of government analyses ofsiguificant legulafions.  In ad- 
dition, the Federal Register can be found in libraries and on the Internet  s 
This paper has two objectives: first, to identify  the kind of information 
contained in economic assessments of regulations that axe presented in the 
Federal Register, and second, to suggest how information in the Federal 
Register could be modified to make the regulato  W process more transpar- 
ent, thus enhancing regulato|7 accountabifity  9  While this ~nnlysis 
on federal  regulation in the United States, the findings and policy recom- 
mewt~alons are readily applicable to other jurisdictioes dealing with regu- 
latory rfform both inside and outside of the United States.  TM 
Part I develops the basic research methodology for evaluating Federal 
Register notices  and summarizes the main analytical  results."  Part II ex- 
3009-366  (1996)  (¢nteblishing  requiranmt  for OMB reports).  See,  ~,  ROS~T W. 
~ALL  Kr Ja~., AN AC.,ENDX  FOX FEDER~ ~y  P.EFO~4 4 (1997) (advoc~ing 
that regulations should be judged by their umque costs and benefits); Amtow sr AL., supra 
note I, at II. 
7.  ~  ROBERT W.  HAHN  ,B-  ROBERT E.  Lrr.~,  l~gov~  R~cn..aToay 
Accox.~rrAB~t~rr,t 3-5 (1997) (en~ph~ino that one-t/me report re~  by Onmibus Con- 
solidated Appropriations Act is signifgant but must be ,~,-  a pc~manant ~equire~-~ in 
ord~ to have  lining iml~t en re~tory reform). 
8.  The Government  Printing  Offico  publishes  the Federal  RegiJter.  See.  e.g., Na- 
tional ,4rchives and Records Admini~tralion  Database for the 1995. 1996, 1997. 1998, 1999 
and  2000  Federal  Regi~er  (visiied  June  29,  2000)  <hep:/~vw.acccss.g~.gov/ 
su_docs/e~'acesl40.hlml> (repres~tlng official web sRe of Govexnment Prlnti.~  Office); 
Private  Academic Library  Network of  ~  GPO Access  at  PALNI (visited  Jene 29, 
2000)  <http'.//www.palni,edu/gpo>  (providh~  daily  FederaIRegistereatfies). 
9.  The  focus  of  the  paper  is  not  the  validity  of  the  hffc~nafien  contained  in  the  Fed- 
eral Register notices, but rathes what is and is not contained in the notices. 
10.  See genera//y J. IAfis Gtmsch & Robc~ W. Hahn, The Costs and Benefits of  Regu- 
lation: Implicalions for Developing  Coinages, 14 WORLD  BANK R~. OBS~VeR 137, 149- 
51 (1999) (d~usmtg dmegnlation in Latin Amcxica and Mexico, among oth¢~ devdoping 
COUlRI~)~ OP~ANISATION  FOR ECONOMIC  CO-OPEKAI~ON  AND  DEVELOI~X~NT,  REGULATORy 
IMPACT  A~qALYSlS:  Bxs'r  P~c'ncns ~  OECD Coum'a~ 7 (1997). 
1  I,  Unless otherwise sper.ified, the term "FederalRegister  m3fices" will be used in this 
pap~ to denote the doctnmmts that agencies publish in the Federal Regi3ter for tbek ragu- 930  ADMI~STRATIVELAWREVIEW  [52:3 
plains how to change those notices to include relevant economic informa- 
tion on the impacts of regulation in a  user-friendly format,  h  also ad- 
dresses issues of enforcing the proposed changes and providing useful ag- 
gregate information. 
I.  BACKGI~OUND,  MErHODOLOGVAND  RF.SULTS 
last six presidents have introduced different regulatory oversight 
mechanisms with vmyin8 degrees of success.  In 1981, President R~2~n 
was the first president to fonnally require estimation of  the costs and bene- 
fits of  major regnl~tlons in Executive Order 12,291.  t2  The results ofthoso 
analyses we~ fiequently summarized in the Federal Register.  l~R~dent 
Bush also used Executive Order 12,291.  In  1993, President Clinton re- 
placed the Reagan Executive Order 12,291 with Executive Order 12,866, 
which requires similar ~,l~tn~y analyses,  t3 
Clinton Executive Order aimed to make the ¢g,,l~tn~y process more 
efficicot and tnm,Rmre~  It established twelve principles for writing regu- 
lations that ageacies should follow "to the extent permitted by law and 
where applicable.  "14  Four of these principles'are particularly relevant for 
this analysis. Fhst, each agency must assess the costs and benefits of a rule 
and only adopt it "upon a  reasoned dctormln~tlon that the benefits of the 
intended regulation  justify its custs.  "15  Second, each agency should assess 
alternatives to the regulation.  I~  Third, all agencies should assess the effects 
of'federal regulations on state, local and Uibal governments.  I~  Last, and 
latiom~ These notices  may  or may not ¢cmtoin  ecommic  analyse¢ 
1Z  See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). Pre~dent Reagan's Executive 
Order defiord a "flOor"  rule as emy ride: 
is likely to leStllt ~  (l) An a~tua] effect on the econm~y o~ $100 millirm or 
moR; (2) A major increase ia costs or prices for co~m~% individual indusld~ 
Federal, State or local 8ovem~mt as~tcies, or geographic  regions;  0¢ (3) Sigrdficant 
adverse effects on competition,  employmeat, investme~ productivity,  innovation, or 
on the ebility of lhfited States-based e=~to  mmpete with fordsn-besed ,,~,-- 
prls~ in domm~ or ~'t  mm~ 
Exec. (kd~No. 12,291 § 1(3Xb),  3 C.F.R. at 127-28. 
13.  See Exe¢. (kc]~ No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993). Pre~deot Reagea's Executive 
Order uses the term "major," while Premdeot C]inton's Executive Order 12,866 uses the 
te~n ~ionif'car¢" Exec.OrderNo.  12,866 §2(f),3C.FJ~at641. ]his papor will use the 
term ~i~iflcant as was used in the more recent order by ~  Clinton. 
14.  Exe¢. Order No. 12,866 § I(b), 3 C.FJR. at 639. 
15.  Exec. Order No. ]2,866  § ](bXti), 3 C.FJR. at 639. 
16.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § l(bXS), 3 CJF.R. at 639 (staling that altemativea in- 
clude economic  inceotives  and interest of  providin8 information  to the public). 
17.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § l(bX9), 3 C.F.R. at 640 (commeofin8  "as appropri- 
ate, agezcles shall seek to harmonize  Federal re8~  actions with rPJated  State, local, e~d 
tn'bal  xegulatory  eext  other  govermnem  fmations"). Jj 
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most impo~antly, all regret  at'ions gh,".~d "be simple and easy to under.trout 
.1| 
.  .o. 
Federal Focus, a consulting  firm, cxamincd ~the Envinmmental Pmtec- 
fion Agency's compliance with Executive  Order 12,866. ~9  More  recently 
researchers have looked at the complmce  of all t~-gttt~tngy ag~molcs.  ~° 
Fedcxai  Focus  created  a  report card  for final  and  proposed  re~dnfimm 
pro~n~Sat~i bctw~  Apr~ and S~tembcr of t994.  Their ~s  c=am- 
iMd ~?  ~ubstanfivc  ~  rules by the Envlnmmental  ~ion  Agency 
using Federal Register notices.  The Office of Information ~.d Rcgulatmy 
Affmr~ (OIRA) within OMB classified forty-five of those rules as "signifl- 
c~t. "m The report used a nembe~ of evab,~t~,m ~  which were based 
c~ Executive Older 12,866.  ~  For e~mnplc, OIRA examined whether the 
reg,,'~*,~y actioa was undertaken because of pubfic need or law; whether 
costs and bmefits were assessed; iftho agmcy made a  de~nninafic~ that 
benefils ju~ficd  costs; if the age~-y considered altemntlves and selected 
l&  Exe~ Oni~No. 12.866§ I(bXI2),3C.F.R. at640" 
19.  ~  13m ~  t=ca P.~3ULA~OIy  POLIO, I;~USaAL  Foct~ INC., E1~mmm 
Accoum'AeaxrY ~  Dsvs~oPn~ Wett~-FouN~D  I~V~tAL Rr~trLATIONS: AN 
"lhn=o~r CAm~ ON Cc~qcs  Wrm Ks~ ~  oF ~  Rr~OLA~y ~ 
Omit (EO. 12,866) (1995) [her'~'~ l~s I~ .,~T~  ~  ~oax I'OUC-r]. 
20.  ~.e ~TW.  HAm~'rAL, ASSESSmO  II~'ULATORy  boAcrAN~YS~  Tim 
FA~  OF/Lr~,~ms ~o Cc~v  Wrm ~  ORr,~ 12,866, 23 I~¢~. IJL. & 1~ 
PoL'Y  859  (2000). 
21.  Federsl F~us defined "sub~m,~,¢  raks" m rides th~ 
[W}e~ not technicd or ~" • types of ac~  sud~ as Cleaa Air Ar.t Sine 
I~plmmm~m Plan C'SIP") ~,,,~,  w  mmdmmts to Inevims r-b,,~,~ 
noti~ solici~ion ~publk c~.~nt~ ~  c~nectio~ denials O/'l~ti~om f~ 
staY~ ~w"~t  Pe~od ex~-~  re~=~g or cc,~r~ p~x~, de~m~m  or air 
~.  =~  ptamn8 mea~ ead dmSes of  .~,~ 
Tm~ I~= h ~  trrs ma It~tn.~ ~o~y Po~c~  , s~m note 19, e~ 4. 
22.  OMB charles rules m "~-.ificam" if they fall within the categories e~b~ 
by Cliatm's Exec~ve On~.  See Exe~ ~  No. 12,866 § 2(0, 3 C~.R. 638, 641-42 
(1993). A "~ienlf~mt"  re~,h~y e~tion  is one that may: 
(I) Have m  ~.,~eal  effect on the econ~ay of  $I  00 mi~n~ or mere or advem~ affe~t 
in a martial wsy th= ecm~ay, a s~r  of th,- eon~r.~y, pn~_'vity, c~ion, 
jobs, the mvlromne~  publk health ~  mfety,  or State, local, or ~n'b~l  gove~mmls  ~ 
(2) Create a  serious  inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action t~  or 
plmmed by another ase~  ~ 
(3) Materially alter the budgetmy impact of eatitlcraents, grant~ use= fees, o~r loan 
pr~.m..~ m"  the t~ghts and obligations of  ~ecipimts thereo/:, or 
(4) Raises novd legal or policy issues m~ng oul of legal mandates, the President's 
prim~ies, ~  the 1~nciples set fo~h in this Executive o~ler. 
Id. 
23-  SeeTl~l~.,trm~o~R~'tn~TO~VPOLi~-,supranote 19,at4-7. 932  -  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW  .  [52:3 
the least burdensome option; if OIRA rejected or t~tumed the rule to the 
agen~ for modif~e~tlon, and if  the agancy withd~w the rule. 
The report found that the Environmental Prote~on Agency (EPA) was 
not c~mplying with Executive Order 12,866 for most regulations that were 
examined.  It is important to note, however, that the report only reviewed 
EPA regulations over a short period of time.  Moreover, the authors did not 
report their methodology in enough detail to allow for replic~ttion of the re- 
seits.  For example, they state that the benefits justified the costs for s~x 
ndes.  u  The authors of the report do not indicate if  the agency was required 
to state specifically  whether the benefits  justified the costs, or if  the authors 
simply drew their own conclusions. 
In this paper, I have created a  rsgnl~oty scorecard for uinoty-two sig- 
nificant final and prolx)se, d rules promulgated by five agencies over the 13e  - 
fled 1990 to mid-1995.  2s  To score those rules, I used both Federal Regis- 
ter notices and t~atosy  impa~ analyses (RIAs).  26  I based the analysis on 
four factors: if costs were assessed; if benefits were quantified; if benefits 
were monetized, and if the agency ~¢t-~tpd that it dotennined that benefits 
exceeded the costs.  I found that a large number (99%) ofannlyses relx~rted 
cost infonnation; most (87%) reported a quantification of benefits; only a 
few (25%) actually monetized those benefits; and even fewer (18%)  re- 
ported that they found th~ monetized benefits ~ed costs. 
The methodology used in this paper borrows from the studies by Federal 
Focus and a book that I edited in 1996. 2~  I was also interested in identify- 
' ing vmiables  that were objective in the sense that the methodology could be 
replicated.  The agency only rec~-ived credit on my regulatory scorecard for 
what it explicitly  stated in the relevant Federal Register notice.  2s 
The subsequent analysis takes the information provided in the Federal 
24.  See M. et 8. 
25.  See Robelt W. l'l~hn~  Regu/atoty P~f~rm: B"haf Do the Governments Nnmbers 
Tell Us?,/n ~  CosTs, Ab~ ~  SAV~J 208, 212 (Robert W  l~hn ed., 1996) (ex- 
plsining methodolosy  fro"  study). 
26.  An RIA typlcally  provides an ageagy's  estimate  of the enonomic  and stgial impacts 
ofa l-,J  ~osed sientficant  1'~,~d  ~*'~n, 
27.  See ~  l~Trlxr~ volt  ~T~.¥  P¢~I~, supra note 19;, see also IJmhn~  SuZwa 
note 25, at 208. 
28.  Another offgial publication, called the Code of Federal Regulatiom (CFR~ pro- 
vides a coc~cafion of gemmd and pcmnoae~t  rule& See general~ The National  Arrives & 
Records AOmi~,  About  the  Code of Federal RegwlationJ (visited June 29,  2000) 
¢~ttp://www.access.gov/v.era/about-ctrdxtral>  (~ne Code of  Federal Regulations (CFR) is a 
codification of  the 8enca-al  and pcamanost  rides  published  in the Federal Register by the Ex- 
ecutive _dep~_qmcatts  and ageagies of the Federal Govermnost.'). However,  these rules are 
only codifu~l  in the CFR after they m-e published  in  the Federal Register. 
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Register as given.  Many scholars have questioned thc validity  of that in. 
fonnafion, but that is not my intent here.  Rather, IwiUassess the ertentto 
which Federal Register notio=s adequately  summal~ .poicutially  useful 
information  on the impacts of ggelatio~ ~  Pt~sent;-o such information  in 
a ~  format and makin E  it easily accessible is important bccausc 
doing so am help overnight agencies and othe~ ir~=n:sted parties check on 
its validity.  It would also l)e~nlt mm assessment of whether  the govern- 
meat's own n:sulatory malyses suppmt its decisi~ 
My sample included final rules p,,:~,dgated by w~ulato~ asendes frmn 
1996 thro-~h Fcbnm~ 10, 1998 that were subject to ~view by the OMB. 
The first step in the annlysis  was to ~  a  fist of final ~-gulafions ~_~i.~ 
the OMB's li,,, of "Executive  Order Reviews Complctcd for Economically 
Significant Relpd~om. "~  I chosc to scview "econ~ically  significant" 
ndcs (as defincd by Kxecutivc  Order  12,866) bec~,,~e they me  likely to 
have the largcst  economic mM social impacts. ~'  Thus, it is important  for 
thc public to havc adcquatc  information  about them.  I  cxamincd  both 
L,  ausfer and n~-tran~fer rules.  Trans~ roles typically involve Imge budg- 
etmy  tr~nnfers  ~z  while  non-transfer  rules  typically  involw  regulations 
29.  A rda~d i.~m b  whether the info~qtlon nat gepogted is avm'l,~hle  stmxewheze m 
the govca~ment (©.g, i~ an RIA).  Wlu']e this is.~e is not investigated  leae, I believ© it is 
wcmh explmin8 f~he~.  Dem8  m coutd hetp shed  li8~ oa the qee~ea of whether the Fed- 
era/Rtg/.~er nolkes feil to ~  key infm'~  or ~  that b~n~timt iq .~mply 
not mm~Ahte. 
Rgge~ ~  ~  ~  in m~my  ~  the il~Ol~fioR i~ Mn~gy DDI awnilahl~ 
See, e.g., STAFF OF ~  CO~mL ON Com~m~,  10$th Cm¢o., Sugv~" oF 
Ac~x~cms oN  Comm  o~  Fmr~nAL I~OVLATm~ 1-17  (C.-,,~..  Print 1997);  E[At~  ~  note 
25, at  210-I l  (dim~  e~.  armhole in  ms  RLA);  HAm¢  mr  ~  ~  note  20. 
30.  ~.e ~  m  Executive Order RevL-ws Comp~  for Ec~i~al]y  Si~nt 
Re~,Lqfi~m~, Rgl~,~.',,y Infonnaficm  Se~vic~ Ceum', W~chi~  D.C. (July 30,  1999) 
(sealgh oft~8-t,~ns f~  Feb. I, 1999 t~ July 31, 1999) (on file with author). 
31.  Tim ~  Accom~ing Ofl~c~  (GAO) also mvicws nd~ v,~..u,dgated by agm- 
cies.  Theze w¢~ a number of ~  where the Infopn ~tion ~rted  in the Federal Reg- 
L.~r not/ce conflicted with the informaticcs p~vided by GAO.  For ~I~,  the Depart- 
mint of l~.,dn~ and lhben D~elupm,mt's Fedsra/R~g/st~ notice for their rule on Singk 
Family Mezt~n~ Insman~ does not mention an economic 8mdym.s. However,  the GAO 
repo~ says that one wes complctat and it repcgts cost estimetc~  See Depmtme~ of Hous- 
it~ and Urban Devglopmmt, Single Family ,~,'tguge In.infancy: Loss l~tigatlon Pmce- 
derek,  0GC-96-33  (vi¢ited June 29,  2000) <ht~p:I/www.gao.govld=cisions/majrule~ 
og96033.htm>. 
Du~  GAO's t~vicw proc~s, the age~y also emm~m tlm accompmayin  8  RLAs. 
This edemmt may ~count for the d~Tere~.e betwe~a the information found in the Federa/ 
Regiater and the infotmatlon provided by GAO. 
32.  Transfe~ rules dictate how fede~ govenunent rece/pts aze spent in particular cose.~ 
~les  of transfeg rules in~ude the Medic~.~c and social  secm'ity regulations that involve 934  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW  [52:3 
aimed at modifying the  behavior of finns,  individuals, and govemmeat 
agencies.  ~ 
i created a ~hase  with seventy-two  final rules.  ~"  Each rule was scored 
on pertinent information related to alte~ves  considew~ costs, bestirs, 
and other essential economic information.  ~  Table I  provides a summa~ 
of this ~n~lysis.  The table coasts of ~ix sections: the first section reviews 
alternatives; the second section ~views costs; the third section reviews cost 
savings; the fourth section reviews benefits; the fifth section reviews bene- 
fit-cost information; and the sixth section ~views other key economic as- 
sump~ious. 
Five categories of rules are conaldered in the table: all rules, those des- 
ignated as transfer roles, non-Uansfer rides,  rules for which a  RIA was 
complct~l, and rides for which there was no RIA.  The reason for catego- 
rizing the ndcs this way is because I cxpcctcd that transfer and non-tmnsf~ 
rules would pn:sent different information because the former typically in- 
volvc on-budget expenditures and the latter involve off-budget expendi- 
trzmsfers Kin. gcslm'a[ taxpay¢~ to rc~picms.  ~-~  to OblB "U1m~ca'~  are payments 
fx~n one group in society to anotl~r mid ther~m~ m~ not real corn to soci~ as a who~" 
O~'lc~ (wL,~wox~ULTION  Am) R~GtU.ATOX't  A.'~AmS, ~m  not~ 1. at oh. L 
33.  Non-tr~'¢~ r-b- ~....~ned by OMB f~lmmt]y aim to hdp protect the ¢=xviron- 
m~t, l~alth, and saf¢~y. Noa-Usmfer ,m.~, such as mvimnmc~ml  rq~ulatiu,~ oflm im- 
pose lmge  co~ on mcic~y,  but do not have a Ims¢ oa-budgd ~  They  freqmmtly 
a~Fect pr~e  bxh]sb'y dkectly t~oush ~  b  c....:.llm~ee cos~ 'rod ~m.s  ir.IL 
rectly ~mm~ tlx~ impact on ~¢ ~¢es of Soo~ ml  mvi¢~.  "roey ~so ¢~0 ]~re ~or- 
rant bmlr.~L% inch m _,~h_  _  _,~om ;- h-~,m heath rail 
34.  The ~st of roles wes ~ted  flora the OMB's list of economimlly  ~;~m~cant 
r.~  fi~" 19% tl~oush Fcbrmry I0, 19~8. Only tirol ndm w,  ue reviewed, ~  wMch th¢~ 
wm~ 88.  One of the rules, EPA's National Ambi¢~ A~r Quality  Smndm~b  for Sulfur  Ox- 
idm was set inviouMy and the agency  was ~quixed  by the Clean Air Act to ~view  its stm~- 
dard~ Aflcrr~,mlyzinsthemmdmds,  the agcvcy  decided  not to change  them. Thisnfle 
was not ~on.~l~ed in the ~qmp~e  became the 0~i~r~t nile came up pficz  to our ~mple ~ 
date.  Thee w¢~ fifle¢~ other rutes that could not be lo~_t,-d u~n~ the Federal Register 
Hence, the ~t~e  c,~ed  sevcmty-4wo  rule~ The br~t~wn of the riles by 
agcmy  was the fonowing:  the Dc~tm,~ of Agriculture  had sevmtcea ru~ the Depart- 
m¢~  of  Commerce  had four n,t~. the Depm~c~t of Energy  had two ml~s,  the Depm'oncm 
of Health  and H.m~n S~vices had ~  mle~ the Dcperane~t  of Horn/n8 md Ud)an 
Devdopm~t  bad two rul~ the I)epmmem of the lnmior had three rifles; the ~ 
of Iusfice  had one m~, flu-  Dcpmlmm~  of Labor lind thn:e nfl~ the Dqpm~mt  of Tnms- 
po~tio~ had ~ix rul~ the Depar~¢m of Vetmm~  Affl~rs  had o~e nd~ the Envinmm~ 
Protection Agmcy had ~  rules; the Geacral  8¢rvicea  AdminisWation  had one nd~ the 
Social 8¢multy  Administration  had three rules; and th¢~ were two rulm that w¢~ w.l~ 
jointly by the Treasury  Dqpmlmeut,  the Depmlmeat  of Comm¢~,e  and ~e I~pmlment of 
Health  v~d Humau  Se~ice~ 
35.  Once each Federal Register notice was reviewed, the data were eatead into a d~ta- 
base. Each  notice was then reviewed  a second  time to check for accura~.  See Table I, in- 
fra l~ 949,  for more details on c~o~y  defud~ic~, scoring,  and ~lditional d.t. 2000]  REGULATORY  ACCOUNTABILITY  935 
tm~s.  I also expected the natu~ of analysis to differ for roles that h~wl an 
RIA and rules that did not.  Specifically, rules with an RIA were expected 
to have more useful economic information contnined in the Federal Regis- 
ter,  since the  notice could rely on  the  economic analysis done  for the 
RIA.  ~ 
A.  A/ternattves 
Agencies have  many  altemafive approaches  to  achieving  regulatory 
goals. ~  they can choose the specific mechanism and the stringency of 
a  regulation. While these options sometimes are restricted by legislative 
mand~,~% agencies usually have to make choices along several dimensions. 
choice of a regulatory approach from a set of altemafives is one of the 
most  important  functions  an  agency  is  asked  to  perfonu.  President 
Clinton's Executive Order  12,866 states that "agencies should assess all 
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alter- 
native of not regulating." The following discussion reports on the extent to 
which agencies pres~ted information on their assessment of altemafives in 
the Federal Register. 
The first section of the table evaluates the review of alternatives to the 
proposed regulation.  It consists of three measures: whether a  notice said 
alternatives were considered in the regulatory analysis, whether alternatives 
were actually discussed, and whether there was some at~mpt to present a 
quantitative analysis of alternatives. 
In general, there was little consideration of alternatives.  ~  For all sev- 
caW*two  rules, thirty-one  (43%)  considered  altemafives; only  nineteen 
(26%) discussed specific alternatives; and eight (11%)  quantified them. 
Comparing transfer rides with non-transfer roles reveals that altemafives 
were  considered,  discussed,  and  quantified less f~quanfiy  for  transfer 
rules.  For example, seven (21%) of the transfer rules considered alterna- 
fives while twenty-four (63%) of the non-transfer rules did so.  Comparing 
notices that had no RIAs with notices that had RIAs reveals a similar pat- 
tern.  In the case of notices with no RIAs, a review of the Federal Register 
did not reveal that alternatives were considered, discussed, or quantified. 
For notices with RIAs, thirty-one (54%), or slightly over haif~ of the Fed- 
36.  Most  non-t~nsfur rules (89%) had RIAs (34 of 38). A lower proportion (68%) of 
lzunsfer  rules had RIAs  (23 of 34). See Appendix,/nfra  p. 953, § I-A. The quality  of RIAs, 
however, can vm'y  dramatically  across ndes.  Frequently,  transfer  rides do not rec,';ve the 
same levd of sentry in the KIA analysis. 
37.  Then: we~: four rules that identified stetutory  restrictions  on considering  alteroa- 
fives,  including  EPA's rules for particulate  matter and ozone. 936  ADAHNISTRA TIVE LAW REVIEW 
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B.  Costs 
Regulations can impose costs on individuals in several ways incAudln~ 
higher prices, lower wages and lower returns on equity. Comprehensive 
of regul~tngy costs M|ow decisionmakers to compare reg~d:~.n~y 
altem~ves.  They can also allow dec/sionmakefs to consider distributional 
concerns by assessing the economic impact of a  regulation on different 
groups. 
The second section of the table reviews information on costs.  It consists 
oftlm:e measems: whether a notice said costs were assessed, whether costs 
were reported, and whether costs were monetized.  3s  Thc ~m is similar 
to the pattern observed with altern~'ves, except the notices say costs were 
assessed in more cases)  9  Of all the roles, forty-nine (68%) ~t,.~ that costs 
were assessed; forty-one (57%) reported the costs, and thirty-nine (54%) 
monedzed the~.  The number of non-Uansfer rules that said they assessed 
cos~ was slightly higher than for transfer rules, but notices with RIAs 
stated that costs were assessed much more often.  For notices with RIAs, 
fogty-six (81%)  said thnt costs were sssessed compmed with only three 
(20%) for those notices that had no RIA. 
Notices said that cost savings were assessed in only about one-fifth of all 
cases.  In some cases, rules simply may have not h:uf cost savings, so it is 
difficult to know whether this number is a good estimate of the number of 
rules that actually would yield cost savings.  Interestingly, of the sixtean 
notices stating that cost savings were assessed, fourteen ac~,~lly provided 
estimates of those savings--a fairly high proportion when compared with 
the overall cost or benefit category. 
C  BeheSts 
There are many different kinds of benefits to reg~dn~ons,  depandin~ on 
their focus.  Some of  the more significant benefits include reductions in the 
risk of dying, getting sick, or being in an accident.  Benefit estimates allow 
decision makers to determine whether a  proposed regulation is likely to 
38.  For costs to be assessed,  the agency  had to state in the Federal  Regi~er notice that 
costs  had becm  ,,~-,~,~,~L For costs to be identil'~l, the agency  had to give a descr~  and 
some qumtificafion  of the costs in the Federal  Reglster notic~ For costs to be monefized, 
the agency  had to pcovide  dollar estimates  for the costs of the t~l~  See App~dix for mote 
det~l!~ 
39.  Relatively few notices identified infommtion  pertninln  8 to edmlnlsttative costs, 
local and stato  government  costs, mulothor  costs. SeeAppcodix, infmp. 958, §I-B. J 
2000]  REGULATORFACCOUNTABILITF  937 
yield substuntial benefits and therefore may be worth implementing, and 
which groups are likely to benefit most as a result of a regulation. 
Notices stated agencies assessed the benefits in about half of the cases, 
half of the cases, but rarely t~orted and almost never monetized them.  Of 
all the rules, thirty-eight (53%) stated that benefits were assessed; twenty- 
seven (38%) reported benefits in the Federal Register nofce and fifteen 
roles (21%) monetized those benefits.  Notices for non-transfer rules noted, 
reported and provided monetary estimates of benefits more frequently than 
tnmsfer ndes.  The same partem was observed in enmparing notices that 
had RIAs with notices that did not 
D. Net  Benefi~ 
A comparison of costs and benefits of a regulation helps decision makers 
and stakeholders assess whether that regulation would improve upon the 
status qua.  Without  such  a  comparison,  decision makels cannot know 
whether a  regulation is likely to result in a  more efficient allocation of 
available resources. Somewhat surprisingly, I found that agencins routinely 
failed to ~=ae. whether benefits exceeded costs. This suggests that either the 
underlying regulato~ impa~ analysis did not calo,l~te this key piece of in- 
formation or the Federal Register notice failed to report it. 
Only fifteen of the notices (21%) stated that the benefits of the rules ex- 
ceeded the costs.  This was scmewhat smptising be~-~  Exe~tive Order 
12,866 calls for an adoption of the regulation "only upon a reasoned deter- 
minatiun that the benefits of the intended regulation  justify its costs.  '~° 
Relatively few notices (24%) reported key economic information on the  , 
present value of costs and/or benefits; annual estimates were reported more  i 
frequently (40%), perhaps reflecting the fact that such estimates were mo~ 
prevalent in RIAs.  In general, notices for transfer rules presented benefit- 
cost information more frequently than notices for non-transfer rides.  The 
sarne patterns were observed for notices with RIAs when compared with 
notices without RIAs. 
The final section provides information on two key economic assumption 
-  the discount rate and the dollar year of the estimate~  The discount rate is 
used to compare benefits and costs at different points in time. The dollar 
year is necessary to describe the value of the dollars being discussed. Of 
the seventy-two mlas, forty-one applied to more than one year.  41  The dis- 
count rate was reported only about one-third of the time for those rules in- 
40.  Exec.  OrderNo. 12,866 § l(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638,639(1993). 
41.  The vm~ning rules weae eith~ applied  to one year or were unclear based on the 
Federal  RegiJter  notice. 938  ADMINISTRAT1VELAWREV1EW  [52:3 
volving multiple years.  The dollar year was t~orted in only six percent of 
all cases and ton pereent of rules involving multiple years.  In the case of 
transfer rules, the dollar year was never reported,  perhaps mflce~ing that the 
dollar year is clearer for budgetaxy transfers.  Yet the dollar year was only 
reported in fifteen percent of non-transfer rides involving multiple years. 
Notices for non-t,~sfer rules and rules with RIAs did better at reporting 
these details than notices with transfer roles and notices without RIAs, re- 
spectively. 
The dm~base provides examples of specific rules that scored well and 
poorly.  42  Examples of non-transfer rides ~  scored well and poorly are 
the 1997 Quality Mammography Standards nde and the 1996 Revisions to 
the Expo~ Adroini~tration Regulations, respectively.  The 1997 Child and 
Adult Care Food Program and the  1997 Disaster Reserve Assistance Pro- 
gram rules are examples of transfer rules that scored well and poorly, re- 
spcetively.  43  The Mammo~hy  role scored the best of the non-trmmfer 
roles, reporting infonnation on costs, cost savings, and benefits.  The only 
categories it did not score well on were the discussion or qnamii~3tlon of 
alternatives, the item~tlon of cost savings and reporting the dollar year. 
The Food Pmgnun rule scored the best of the transfer rules.  It also re- 
ported information on costs, cost savings and benefits.  The only categories 
it did not assess were the consideration of alternatives, a statement thnt the 
benefits of the ride exceeded the costs, a  report of the discount ~at~, the 
dollar year of the estimates or whether the totals were in the present value. 
The Export Regulations, a non-transfer rule, and the Disaster Reserve role, 
a transfer rule, both failed in almost all ways that I measured.  44  "1~ only 
categow the Federo! Register notices reported assessing for these rules was 
the paperwork impact. On average these gules did quite pcorly, with the 
42.  The maximtml acorn  a rule coeld reseive was 31 if it was applic~le to morn than 
one yeer and 28 if it only applied to one yesr.  The rules that scored well both applied to 
mole than one ye~. The mlas that had low acores d~d not apply to mese titan one yeas. 
43.  The 1997 Quality Mmmnography  Standards was a Food and Drug .Athnlnlc~ation 
rtlk that established stmldalds for mfanmography facilities and facility evlt]uafi~.  The 
1997 Child ~d Adult Cede Food Pin,am was a DepartmmR of ~  role that 
ame~led the re~lafioua gova~ing the re~nbur~t  fc~ mes]s se~ed in day care ~ 
The 1997 Disaster P~',ve Assistance Pro~em was a Depm~ent of As~ctdtm= rule that 
provided assistance  to farmers  whose production of  livestock  feed was advessely  affected by 
severe winter conditiom,  The 1996 Revisions to the ~  Achninistretion  Rcenl~im~ 
was a Depm~mt of Cemme~e .rule  that implemea~ed  the Prmideat's reform of computer 
export con~ol~ 
44.  The~ were six roles that failed in almost all respcgts, md one rule that fail~ ~m- 
pletdy. The two rules discussed  here were chose~ because they were not prevented  by stat- 
ute from assessing  costs and  b~efit~ J 
2000]  REGULATORY  ACCOUNTABILITY  939 
notices only reporting relevant information for a  third of the categories. 
The non transfer rules did slightly  better tlum the troffer rules. 
Them are several conclusions to be drawn frem ~Js nnnlysis of the 
nomic information contained in Federal Register notices.  First, few no- 
ti~s do a  good job of reporting key o:onomic  information conc~:mlnz 
costs,  benefits,  reg~dAtory  altem~tive~,  and key cconomic ~sumptions. 
The question retrains  whether  such  information is  readily  available.  While 
I  e'~mot provide a  q-~-titafive answer to this question, it is likely that 
much more information is available than reported.  For example, in only 
about sixty pcreent of the cases did notices report monetizcd costs for rules 
with RIAs; yet I found that cost or cost savmgs were estimated in virtually 
all oftbe cases I examined in an earlier study of RIAs.  4s  Thus, it is quite 
likely that the Federal Register notices are not taking adv~tagc of impor- 
tant information contained in RIAs.  *s  Moreover, such information s~ould 
be available if President Clinton's Executivc Ordcr  12,866 h~  been ira- 
plemc~ted cffcctivcly.  4v 
A second important conclusion is that notices for hansfer rules tand to 
~ort  less information on their economic impacts than notices for nora- 
transfer nde,  s.  This is due,, in part, to the  diHe1~nce in  natnre of these rules 
and the level of scrutiny each receives.  "rne regulatoxy review process ~p- 
propriately focuses more efforts on no~-transfer rules bee~mcc mgulotors 
have more diseaction in devising those nde~  A rclated point is that notices 
that rely on RIAs generally report more information than notices without 
RIAs.  This is because RIAs provide economic information that ~n  be 
easily reported in the Federal Register. 
Third,  few  rtdes  report  that  monetized  benefits  actually  exceed 
mon~iz~ costs.  This potmm is consistent with my findings in an ~rlicr 
study.  4s  It suggests that Exccntive Orders 12,291 and 12,866 have bcen in- 
eff~ctiw in stopping many rules t~  would fail a benefit-cost test 
Finally, information on benefits and costs is in relatively short supply in 
the Federal Register notices.  Thus, it  is frequently difficult  to ascertain the 
45.  See  ~  supra  note  25,  e=  212  (finding  99~  of  agencies  reported  informer!an  on 
costs  end  cost  savings). 
46. Recent  resem~ suggests  that  much  information  is  also  unavailable  in  the  RIAs. 
See  onem//y  lb~,  aupm notc 20. 
47.  For a useful discussion  of some of the stnmgtbs  and w~knemes of RIAs reader  Ex- 
ecutive  Order 12,866, see Hxm~, Jup~ note 20.  See abo G~N~AL Accotncrw~ O~t'Ics, 
REGULATORY REF(~b~. AGENCIES COUt.D IMPltOVB  DEVELOPMENT,  DOCUIt~rrATION,  AND 
CLAitn'Y  OF REGULA'IDitY  ECONO~flC  Alq.~LYSlS  I-3, GAO-RCED-98-142 (1998) [lmreinaf- 
fez P.smn~z~tY Rm=o~]. 
48.  See Hahn, supra note 25, at 212 (concluding  only a fraction  of regulations  would 
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likely economic impacts of a  rule on consumers from re~ling such  no- 
tices.  49  The next section discusses  an approach for addressing this deft- 
ciency. 
II.  SUGGESTIONS  FOR REFORM 
This section examines how economic information can be presented in 
the Federal Register in a way that holds regulators and lawmakers more 
accountable, thus making the regulatory process more transparent.  The fo- 
cns is on presenting a summary of the economic impacts of a regulation in 
a "Rcgnlatory Impact Summary"  (]US), which would be part of the Federal 
Register notice for all significant regulations. 
As noted previously, the Federal Register h~ the potential to provide a 
vital information link for the public, interested parties, and government of- 
ficials.  Yet, the precedin~ analysis reveals that a large number of Federal 
Register notices do not contain essential information.  This observation 
does not necessarily imply that an agency failed to complete an sualysis or 
did not discuss that analysis in another document, but it does show that 
agencies arc not reportino potentially useful information in a  visible and 
accessible place.  ~ 
Providing sufficient information, however, is not enough.  It needs to be 
provided in a  standard  format to  help  encourage wider readership and 
greater Wansparency.  Cune~tly, each agency and often p~-h department 
49.  These  conclusions ere ~milar  to GAO's report on the incmpe~ion by agmeies  of 
the OMB's "Best Practices." See Ofl~e of Managanent and Budget,  Econom/c  Ana/y.~ of 
Federal  Regulations  Under Execuffve  Order  12,866  (visited  lane  29,  2000) 
<http://www.whitehou~gov/OMBfmforeg/rinsuide.h~l>  [he~leflzr OMB 1996] (repre- 
santing results of two-year  eiTort  by group to ~  "be~ praatic~" for prepemtg  eco- 
nomic analysis  of  sigdficant regulatory  action called  for by Executive  Order). 
GAO reviewed  twenty RIAs of economically  sigrAficant rules that wexe released 
betwee~ July 1996 and Mm~h 1997. See REGULA'IDR¥  REFORM, $upfu note 47, at 14-16. 
They exemined  whether  asencies followed OMB's guidelines requiting consideration of 
alte~matives  and calculation of costs end bnoefits whan makln~  regulatory  decisions, ld at 
16.  GAO fannd upon t~vicwing  the RIAs,  which ganorally  provide nune detail than Fed- 
end Register notices but me nc~ typically  published in the Federal Register, that some did 
not follow OMB's guidance, la[ at 17.  But they found a higher  percantege  incb~ba con- 
sidorafion of altm~atives  and reposing of costs and benefits  th~n the Federal Register no- 
ticesveviewed  for this  pap~  la[ at 18-19. 
50.  Most  of the govonune~t's  information  on regulatians  is primarily  available  al the 
agancy or in the OMB's  Docket  Off'ge,  access  to which  is difficult and costly for most  citi- 
zans and interested  pa~es.  Thexefore,  I would suggest  that each departme~  keep  a copy  of 
each of its Federal Register notices on its web site.  In addition, agencies  should pubfish 
their regulatory  impact  analyses  online. 2000]  REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY  •  941 
has a pa~cular style for presenting information in the Federal Register. sl 
While the details of regulations and their impacts vary, there are enough 
common elements in an economic evaluation  to justify a standard format. 
It is particularly important to achieve some degree of uniformity  in pre- 
se~tlns an RIS.  Presently, agencies are not legally required to present any 
pa~cular information  in the Federol Register noticc.  They are only re- 
quired to make a  t~rulafion's text available in a  place accessible to the 
public,  s2 
The purpose of the RIS is to provide a clear and concise smnmasy of a 
rule's impact,  s~ A prototype for an R1S is shown in Table 2.  The RIS is di- 
vided into four parts: background on the rule, the ovcrall impact of  the rule, 
a desolation of costs and benefits, and an examination of regulatmy alter- 
natives. 
Descrip~ve lnformotion 
The purpose of the first section of the form is to identify and provide a 
brief  description ofthe type and scope of  the rule.  The entries for "Agency 
and Department/Oflqce Name," '~:.ontact Person," "Telephone Number," 
"Title of the Rule," ~  Number," and "Docket Number" are self-evident. 
For the "rype of Rulemaking" the agency should indicate whether the rule 
is fosal,  interim, proposed, or a notice.  "Type of Rule" establishes if the 
regulation primarily affects the budget or primarily involves reg,,t~on of 
the private sector, individuals, or government  entities. 
51.  For example,  the Food and Drag Administration,  in impbnmnding  the National En- 
virom~*~m!  Policy Act under its jurisdiction, lneSeats a suxonunV of the rule, ~  com- 
ments on the p,  oposed ride and nenr  the end of the role IXeSants its econmnic  mmlysis- In 
conl~rast, the Depm~uent  of Enemy, in its rule on the Energy  Consolation protein, for re- 
frigorators ond freezers,  presents an introduction, some background  on the rule, then dis- 
cusses the technological  feasibility of the rule and provides  an economic  jestifscatian for the 
rule. The conunents on the proposod rule were addressed within the text of the rule as oP" 
posed to bein8 in a separate  section of  the notice. 
52.  See 5 U.S.C. § 604(b)(  1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
53.  I recommend  that bath the Federal  Ragis~r notice and the RIA contem on RIS. 
Much oftba same information  should  also  be incb~l in the executive  summmy  of  the nd~ 
See HAm%  supra note 20, for more information. See also Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. 
Liten, Improving  Regulatmns: Start wilh the Analysis  and  Work  from There, Prepared Tes- 
timony before the Subcom. on Regulatory  Reform  and Paperwork  Rcdectian of the House 
Comm. on Small Business (June 2000) (on fde with author) [horinaites"  ]mpro~ng Regula- 
~o,J}. 
54.  3ee REOUI~TO-v.~t  RI~'OIqM,  supra note 47, a1 5-6 (suggesting  e~ch  RIA cantsin on 
executive ~nnmr/including all costs and benefits, descrying uncertainties of costs and 
benefits, and compmin8  alternatives  considc~i by agency). 942  ADItdlTV1STRA  TIVE  LA W REVIEW  [52:3 
For'~tatotoW Authority for the Rule" the agency should state what stat- 
ute or law gives it the authority to implement the rule.  s5  For "Rulemaking 
Impetus" the agency should indicate what events or law led them to draft 
the rule.  ~s The "Description" should be brief and explain what area the role 
regulates and the mmmer in which it regulates that area. 
B.  Overall Impact 
Executive Order 12,866 classifies a ride as "sienlflcant" if it has an im- 
pact on the economy of $100 million or more in one year.  The Unfunded 
M~daw-s Refonn Act ulasdfies a ride as "signifi~mt" if  the regulation haq 
impant on the private sector and/or state or local governments of more 
,h~, SlOt) million in one year.  ~  Therefore, the tim question in this section 
idemifies whether the ride is significant and if it will have a la~  impact on 
the  economy.  Executive Order No.  12,866  also requires that agencies 
"propose or adopt a reg,l~tion only upon a ~asoned determination that the 
benefits oftbe int~ded reg,!talon justify its costs," to the extent permitted 
by law.  ~  This section asks for a best estitn~te of the benefits and costs, a 
determination of whether benefits exceed costs and a discussion of  the level 
of confidence in the benefit-enst estimates. 
The next few entries in the form involve the mechanics of discounting. 
Discounting is fundamental to convertin  8  costs and benefits that occur at 
different points in time into a present value.  Therefore, an agency has to 
• identify the specific years in which the benefits and costs would occur, de- 
termine what year the rule becomes effective and select a discount rate.  In 
general, the agency should use the discount rate sugsc~ed by an oversight 
agency, such as OMB, to help stsndardi~ estimates.  59  The benefits and 
costs should then be discounted back to the year in which the role becomes 
effective. If  the rule only applies to one year, then discountin  8 the estimate 
is unueceasmy.  The years in which the  benefits and costs are incuned 
should be e~tered into 'Identify the years in which the costs are imposed." 
55.  See 5 U.S.C. § 603(bX2  ) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requir~ aucc~nct  statement  of 
"Statutory  Authority  for the Rule'~ 
56.  See id. §  603(bXl  ) (~ description  ofrensons for actions  taken  by agency  ~ 
57.  See2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(1994  & Sepp. IV 1998);  ~  a/so Exe~ Order  No. 12,866 ] 
3(0, 3 CJ~R. 638, 641-42 (1993) (mandating  other criteria which will d,~Sy t~!mary 
ection as =si~ifr.eat regulatory  action~ 
58.  Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1  (b), 3 C.F.I~ at 639. 
59.  Diffcaent discotmt ratas may be won~nted for diffca~at  problems, such as those 
with pe~icu]arly long time horizons, However,  here the fwst-ordor  problem is ckveloping 
some economic standards that facilitate  comparison across moat  ~  and final rule~ 
See, e.g~,  Ag~OWETAL.,  SU/Wa  note I; OMB 1996,  ~m,a note 49. 2000]  REGULATORY  ACCOUNTAB1Lr17"  943 
Thc "Dollar Year of the Benefits and Costs F.,~unes" should be the year 
in which the rule becomes vffvctive and the agency must the~ state what 
discount r~  they used in their cd~d~ons. 
c.  an#c , 
This sccfion is  divided into a subsection on ben~ts and a mtbsccfioa on 
costs.  ~°  The section on costs is motivated by the Unfimded ~  Re- 
form Act of 1995 and Executive Order  12,866, which both require that 
agencies assess the cost of rules,  u  The flint  question asks for information 
on both the mmual and prosm~t value of costs of a rule.  ~'  Anmm] informa- 
tioa on cost is uscful to dctcrminc cxpcndltmc I~*~rns over time.  The ple- 
scnt value calculation gives ~  estimate of the real value of rcsources that 
would be spent in implemcating the n~,t~c~.  The  first ent~  ~l'otal 
Costs" nxluin=s that the asmcy give a best estimate of the total cost&  The 
entries below breakdown costs into smaller categories that arc ofintcn~ ~ 
"Compliaace Costs" refers to the direct costs that tim private sector will in- 
cur in implementing  the role.  e•  If  the ride is rcgulato  W thca the expectation 
is that most of the costs would fall into this category.  "Admini~Uid;vc 
Costs" rcfcm to those costs that are incuncd in administering  the rule at dif- 
f~u~ levels of govemment.  "Federal Budget Costs" ,,~f,~m  to impacts ~n 
the fedcrai budget from implc=nenting the rule.  ~  If thc ride is a transfer 
ride, then thc ~oa  is that most of the costs would fall into thls c~-- 
gory.  "Local/State Budget Costs" undcr thc Unfunded Ma~t~  Rc~nn 
Act refers to the budgeta~ impacts of the ride on ~tat~ aad local govern- 
mcnts,  e  If  the costs imposed by the rule do not fall into m~y of the t~go- 
60.  Costs  ~  de/ined  ~  costs  minm  cost sav~,L 
61.  ~# 2 U.S.C. § I$32(a) (req  "un~ng, under UnfmKkd  M~,,,.~ Rcfmm Act, a writ- 
te~ ~t~t*ment  ~  an ~  of costs for a rule impomn8  costs of $100 million or 
more on S~to, locsl snd tribal govmm~mts  ~ the privat~  sector);  sGe abo Exez. ~  ~ 
12,866 § 6(3XB)-(C), 3 C.F.R. ea 645-46 (t~qtd~n  8 that costs be assessed for ~rdfiea~ 
and ~y significant  rules). 
62.  Thefcrmmksforadngleannual~fima~ofcostaandbemd'm.  Mm'cinfommtion 
could  u.~ully be incl,_,ded  in  other  lmrts  of  the F,~mIRegis~r notice. 
63.  TI~ ~-qt,"Sc~iea  m'c not mutually  ~,cl'~ve. 1bus, the numbe~ in the ~l'enmt c~e- 
god~ vail  not necesmsily  add  to  the total. 
64.  ~e 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)  (requiring  private seO.or  costs be ~,~,d  by an agency 
when comidem~ rule). Thls~tiraatcshouldincludeaddit/onalpupcrworkbu~km. See i~ 
§ 1532(aX3XA). 
65., For e~Ample,  a rule to clean up federal toxic waste sites could remit in tnc~A~'d 
cxp~ditures at the ~  of Defam. 
66.  See 2 U.$.C. § 1532(oX3XB)  (requiring  csHmm~  by mt agatcy of dlupmpcftimmto 
budgct~y impact  on  stoic  and  local  govamnen~ wh~ conddaing a  rule). 944  ADM277ISTIL4TIVE  LA W REVIEW  [52:3 
des, then the agency should enter them into "Other Costs."  Agencies e~n 
briefly explain their rationale for the cost estimates and expound on their 
approach in the body of  the notice. 
The second question under this subsection identifies key segments th~ 
are affected directly.  The Regulatony Flexibility Act requires that agencies 
assess the impact on small business.  67  The Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act requires that the hnpa~t on the private sector and local, state mzd tribal 
govenuncnts be assessed.  ~  Those impacts should then be described and 
the dollar amounts should be estimated. 
In addition to assessing costs, Executive Order No.  12,866 mtd the Un- 
funded Ma~l~h~ Reform Act both requi~ that agencies assess the benefits 
of a role.  The analysis is similar to that I~quil~ of Costs.  e~  Anmtal and 
present value benefit estimates  should be reported.  It is preferred fl~t 
agenc/es enter dollar values, but that is not n:quired.  If dollar estimates 
cannot be obtained, then some other estimates of benefits should be pro- 
vided where appropriate, such as tons of pollution reduced.  "Total Bene- 
fits" requires that the agency give a best estimate of  the total benefits.  The 
enlzics separate benefits into different categories. "Health Benefits" refers 
to the benefits that act:me fzom reduced humaa health risks or reductions in 
mortality and morbidity resulting fxom a ml¢.  "Pollutio~  Benefits" refer to 
benefits from a reduction  in pollution, for example I00 tons of carlton di- 
oxide.  ~  If the benefits  do not fall into any of these categories thca they 
67.  See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1994 & Supp. 1V 1998). Imn opposed to ~polin~ O1~ thc 
impact on ~m,n business of regulations, while not c.eosid~a8 the more general impact on 
~  and la~p=  b,~h'w~ e~ well  Hone~iess,  ,~,r~n business  is b~rted b,~e  bo- 
cause of statutmy nuluirem~ts that re/kct its pol~  strength. 
6&  ,~e 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998~ 
69.  See id. (statin8 requin~nents of Unfimded  M~ Referm Act).  The teS,  btnry 
pr~:iples of  Exe~tive Ord~"  No. 12,866 requi~e, m~der  section l(bX6), that benefits be as- 
sessed. See Exec. On.'No. 12,866 § l(bX6), 3 C.F.R.  638, 639 (1993). "lhe~ of 
behests is .~i.  reqe~ed  by the e3eecutive  order for sig~ifr.md  rules in section 6(3)(B) and 
for economically  .~imfi  fn~nt rules in section 6(3XC~ See Exec. Ord~  lq~ 12,866 § 6(3)(13)- 
(C), 3 C.F.R. .' 645. Again, it is ir~,~Imte to simply sum e~.~t,.~ of  f~me beaefits as 
this does not ~  for  the time value of  money. If the nde only applies to ~e ye~, rhea 
~  the estbmtes is mmecessary. 
70.  To the ~  ~h  benefits result in reductions in health risks, the nu~bexs in the 
diffen~ ~ries  may not add up to the ~imate of  total benefits. When health and pol- 
htti~t benefi~ are expressed in physical ~  human terms, such as lives saved or tons of  pol- 
lution r~ed,  egesu~s should apply standazd  values to convert those numbers into dollar 
e~n~**~  It would be de.sirable  for an agency, str,  h as OMB, to specify a baseline set of 
bau~d values for purposes of that esthnaSon.  If those values are not si~'ified  , rhea the 
agency should spedfy str.h values in lhe RIS. In eithe~  case, the age~y should explain the 
basis f¢~ its benefit ~ti~,~es in the notice i~elf. 2000]  REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY  945 
should be entered into the "Other Benefits" ~gory.  Agencies are then 
asked to explain briefly their rationale for the benefit estimates.  The next 
few entries in the form again relate to discounting and the beneficiaries of 
the benefits.  7t  The process for completing this section is m~qlogotltS to the 
section on costs. 
D.  Alternatives to the Regulation 
The final section of the form addresses the alternatives that agencies 
should consider when t~gulafing.  Executive Order 12,866, the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act and the Regulatow Flexibility Act all require that 
when an agency regulates, it considem altem~ves to the extent permitted 
by law.  n  In particular, Executive Order  12,866 identifies principles of 
regulation that require agencies to assess the costs and benefits of all alter- 
natives, including the option of not regol~ing, and select the approach that 
maximizes net benefits.  ~  The  Regulatory Flexibility ACt requires that 
agencies give a description of the alternatives conside~l by agencies and a 
statement as to why each altern~ve was rejected.  7.  For these reasons, the 
form includes a  section asking the agency to list and briefly describe the 
alternatives it considered and why those alternatives were rejected.  If al- 
ternatives were not considered then the agency must also give an explana- 
tion.  The RIS then asks for dollar e~th..ates of the costs and benefits of 
each alternative. 
For any particular rule that is deemed "significant,"  I am suggesting that 
the appropriate regulatory agency complete every entw in the RIS.  If an 
answer is not provided for a section, the agency should give a detailed ex- 
planation of why it did not complete that section.  Whenever possible, an 
71.  Typically, the same discount rate should be applied to costs end benefit& so the 
retries conoeming c~scotmtln8  permit a simple check to detev~in~  whether the agmwy  actw 
ally used the seine discouat rat~ 
72.  Executive Oniex  No. 12,866 tcquiras the cons~leration  of ultc~tafives  as pint of its 
reg.latary  principles that agm~ies should follow unless legally wohlbited or inal~mpriate. 
See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § l(b), 3 C.F.IL at 639.  Consideration  of altanatives is also 
reqa~red  of  age~cias  I~OmnlE~tin  8 ¢conomicully  significant rules that they su~nlt to O]]P.A 
unle~ prohibited by law.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(aX3XCXiii), 3 C.F.R. at 646. 
The Regul~ry Flexibility  Act requir~ the con~dmaion of altemativas  as part of the initial 
flexibility anuly~ds  that agencies mus~  complete. See 5 U.S.C. § 603(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998). The ~ded  Mandates Reform Act requires cm~dexatinn of ulte~atives for any 
rule ilmt results in the expenditure of $100 million or more by State, local and tribal gor- 
e,hi,eats 0¢  by the private sector. See 2 U.S.C § 1535(a)  ( 1994  & Sty. IV 1998). 
73,  See Exec. Or:let No. 12,866 § I(a), 3 C.F.P,.  at 639 (noting e,,ception to require- 
me~t if statute ~  e~other  app~ach~ 
74.  See 5 U.S.C. § 604(aX3)(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 946  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  REVIEW  [52:3 
agency should always give dollar estimates and  if not,  explain why.  7s 
Agencies should be clear and precise in answering each question.  If a 
question is not applicable to the rule, them the agency should state this and 
provide a detailed explanation. ~s 
Th~n~ is a precedent for providing summary information on r~ulafions. 
Presently, some states, like California,  Penn~jlvania and Michigan, have a 
teguiatlon summary form that each agency must complete when submitting 
a t~'gulatlon.  California provides a particularly  good example. They have a 
four-page form that serves as a summary and must be in each rule's rule- 
makln~ record. ~  The form became a requirement in March 1998, so it is 
too early to evah-,t, the resullu. 
If states are undenakiag such messures, them is no reason why federal 
agencies esa not do the same.  Moreover, ~n RIS and the accompanyin  8 
economic analysis in the Federal Reg4ster should apply not only to ~gnifi. 
cant regulations overseea by the OMB, but also to all federal relr,l~,,s 
whose mmual impact is likely to ex__~ed~  $100 million.  In ponicular, there 
is no reason to exempt independem agencies, such as the Federal Cmnmu- 
nica~ions Commigsion  arid the Federal Emergy Regulatmy Commission.  ~ 
It should not be assumed that this form will be completed faithfully, 
eve~ if Coagress passes a law requiring it.  Ag~mcies will not ~form unless 
they have an incentive  to do so. I suggest  therefore, that the OMB be givea 
powers to require that agen©ies implement the necessary changes. For ex- 
ample, OMB could be given the power to reject a ragulatoW ~lysls unless 
it meets certain  8uidelines,  includin~ the presentation of a clear executive 
sununmy along with a  regulatory impact summary.  TM  This information 
could then be used in the Federal Register notices, m 
75.  Executive Otd~ 12,866 allows a ¢pmmiGcation  of ¢osts and bem~fita or a cpudi*m. 
tive  ~  ofthzm.  ~  Exec. Ord~ No. 12,866 0 I(a), 3 C.F.R. at 639 (i  993). 
however,  crL~ei~m is Ixefemd,  particularly  for the snmmmy. 
76.  The egemcy should not be required to do so tf  law pmin'bits  it. 
77.  See  Exec. Onk~  No.  W-144-97  §  3  (Cal.  1997) (visited  on June  22,  2000) 
~http'J/c~mmelr,  e.ca.SovJbu~aeas/colponltehl~-lntlnti/xoi44971~nl~,  .~r  a/so  State  of 
Celifo~ia,  Econmfic and Fiscal  Impact Stateme~ ]~lp,b,~m end Onk~ STD. 399 (Rev. 
2-98) (visited on Jme 20, 2000) ~ttp://o....~,.ca.SovJbusme~/cml~n~A, eSuheie~ 
efi.pc~. 
78.  Some ex~nptio~ may be required, such as those re~xl to actiotm affecting the 
money supply, l~ns that are in  response ~o emm'Sency ~t,,,,t;~m could be 
but the a~@e for such e~mptions should be murow. 
79.  See,  e.g, Impro~ng  Regala6mtT, supra note 53. 
80.  A weake~ mfcfcenumt mechnnL~m would be for OMB to inodtw,  e a scorecmd that 
showed how well ageucies provided information on iA,iJo~d  end final gules in the Federal 
Reg/amr.  A scct~md is desirable because it would allow m  assessmmt  of whetl~ age~ 
cies me provJdi-~ more iffmmatic~ mcfe ~¢ict~tly oYeg  ~  altd if  it is easy to tIlld~'- 2000]  REGULATOR]" ACCOUNTABILI7T  947 
Mere compliance is not enough, however.  The oversight agency also 
needs to provide an essessment  of the quality of the analysis.  This assess- 
meat could also he included in the Federal Register at an appropriate  time. 
CONCLUSION ' 
Two important conclusions emerge from this analysis.  First, Federal 
Register notices that present regulatow analysis ~rrantiy exhibit a  gn~ 
deal of variation in the kind of information that is p~sented.  Second, with 
some key dumSns in the r~ulrements for including and presenting infor- 
marion, the content of these notices could be improved dramafiesliy,  m  In 
addition,  such information can be aggregated in a way that provides insight 
into how well or how poorly agencies are complying with guidelines to 
make their analyses  more transparent. 
I have suggested that each agency be required  to fill out a Resulatow 
Impa~ Sunmmry for each significant regulation.  This standardization  will 
make it easier for the public,  interest groups, and academies to obtain in- 
formation On the government's views of the benefits and costs of regula- 
tion.  In addition, it will enable interested parties and government agencies 
to assess the impact of government regulation and the quality of agency 
analysns.  For example, based On the information contained in an RIS, the 
OMB could present a  scorecard  in its annual report  on the benefits and 
costs of ggulation flxat would give legislators and the public a quick way to 
eval,,~- the performance of agancies in doing reg-l~n  W analyses. 
The information identified in the Regulatmy Impact Smnma~ is similar 
to that required by Executive Order No.  12,866, the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act and the Regulatory Flexibility  Act.  Congress should simply 
consider passing an emendment requiring that the information be summa- 
rlzed and produced in the form suggested here.  The cost would be trivial, 
and the benefits could be potentially  quite large. 
Cfities could argue that my recommendations for improving the process 
are hardly worth doing because of the large impact th~ polities  has on 
regulation.  They would be wrong not because polities does not have a large 
impact, but because analysis can help to make the decisionmaking process 
more transparent, thus changing the nature of the politics  and hopefully 
leading to more informed policy  judgements. 
stand. In pmvidin8  this informsfion,  the scorece~d  would also  make  the resulatory  process 
mcfe  tnmspm'e~ 
81.  The findings  of  this paper ere cons/stent  with stun©  of my earlim"  work, whkh ex- 
a~nes both  FederaIReg/~er  notices  end ~.gulatory  irapact analyse& See I-Inh~  supra  note 
25,01208; l-lAtin,  supra r~tc 2. 948  ADMINISTRATIVE 1.4 FVREV1EW  [52:3 
Simply requiring agencies to complete a form will not necessarily  im- 
prove the quality of the information provided.  However, if the basic in- 
formation is at least available in one place, it becomes easier to check that 
all the requisite information is provided.  In addition, the oversight agencies 
and other interested panics can more easily assess its quality. 
Critics of my policy recommendations might also my tlmt making  the 
government's  analysis available is not pa~cularly useful be~l~e of poten- 
tial bias in the analysis.  If  soch bias exists, and I believe it dces, it will be 
easier for skeptics to show how the analysis can be improved  if  the findings 
fiom the analysis am readily available. 
Clearly, more needs to be done to improve the government's analysis of 
regulations,  i believe the key to improving such analysis is to increase the 
mnount of ~ml~.'tition and attention such analyses receive inside and out- 
side of guvemment  One proposal wm~hy of considemtinn is a bill to es- 
tablish  a  congres~onal  oversigl~ agency ~  with assesqlnE regula* 
tions, s2  This agency  maid compete  with the  existing  oversight  office 
within OMB.  s3  SUch  competition could yield better regulatory analysis and 
greater ~cy at a reasonable cost. 
Regulatory refonn will not happen overnight.  Nor will it happen as the 
of a single reform.  This paper has argued that one important avenue 
for reform is to enhance regulatory accountability by providln  E better ac- 
cess to regulatory information.  The Federal Register can and should be 
used to enhance access to such infonuation. 
82.  Set HR. 3669, 106~ Cong. (2000) (recent ~sed  le0~,cc, n that would crmt= 
an ofl~m  witldn OAO to repo~  o~ benefits and costs  of  major  regulations). 
83.  See HAm~  &  LrrAN,  supra  note  7, e~ I. 2ooo}  REGULATORY  ACCOUNTABII-177  949 
Table I 
Summary of Information in F,  sfmd Re~,/~" Notices 
A//  !N~  Trass]'er  RL4  No-R/A 
i 
Nadir  o/RU/~ ~  the Data- 
i  ~  i  72  i  38  [  34  !  $7  i  IS 
~ern~ 
~otice said attematives we~ 
mnsldered  31  24  7  31  0 
43%  ~  63°/,  21%  S4%  0% 
Alternatives discussed  19  13  6  19  0 
26%  34%  18%  33%  0% 
Alternatives quantified  8  6  2  8  0 
11%  16%  6%  14%  0% 
I  I  I  I  i 
Corn 
Nollce said co~  were as- 
sessed  49  28  21  46  $ 
68%  74%  62%  81%  20% 
Costs reported  i  41  I  2S  16  38  3 
57%  66%  47%  67%  20% 
Monelized costs reported  39  23  16  36  3 
i  I $4%  ,  61°/o  47%  ,6,3% I  20% 
Notice said th~cost savings  i 
were assessed  16  10  6  IS  1 
22%  26%  18%  26%  7% 
Cost savings were reported  15  '  10  S  14  1 
21%  26%  15%  2S%  7% 
Moneflzed cost savings re- 
ported  14  9  S  13  1 
19%  7.4%  IS%  7.,3%  7% 
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'  All  Non-  " Tnms/er" RL4 "  No-RIA 
l]Be~q  [  I  ] 
Notiee mid that ~  were  :  I 
sumemed  38  26  12  37  1 
Be~a~iz reported  27  22  S  26  1 
38%  58%  15%  46%  7% 
Monetized bendlis reported  ;  15  11  4  IS  0 
I 21% i  29%  i  12%  126%1  0%  I 
, Notiee sta~s that bmeflts ex. 
costs 
Momelized I~m~r'~ and costs 
Present Value of ~  and/or 
~d'm  reporzed  ~ 
Annual estimate of bements 
15  10  S  i  14  ! 
21%  26%  15%  25%  7% 
14  lO  4  14  0 
19%  26%  12%  2S%  0% 
10  9  i  1  10  0 
24%  i  33%  :  7%  26%  0% 
I 
i 
and/orcosts reported  29  20  9  28  ,  I 
IKev letmmomic AnPmlPltont  I 40%  I  53%  I  26%  149% I  7%  I 
Discomat rate reported*  13  11  2  13  0 
32%  41%  14%  34%  0% 
Dollar year reported  /  4  4  0  4  0 
L  6%  ,  11%  w  0%  I 7%  I  0%  j 
84.  Theprmerdvalueandthediscotmtmtecateg~ie  s, pezceatagesarecompu~.dbasa  t 
on the forty-one rules whose Federal Regi~er notices said applied to more them  one year. 
The "All Rules" column was based on all foW/-one rules.  The~¢  were twenty-seven non- 
u~mfer, fourtc~ transfa', thi~y-eight RIA, and three non-RIA rules that appem~d to apply 
to more than cr~ year  and these w~  the amomgs  used to calculate the pez~c~tasa. 2000]  "  REG  ULA  TO  R Y A C  C  O UBVFABH3TY  951 
Table 2 
Regulatory Impact Summary 
! L BACKGROUND  ON RULK  AND AGENCY 
COI~TACT PERSON  Tl~.wJ~aOt'qE NUMBER 
I 
ins LK  OF THE RULE 
t 
TYPE OF RULEMAKING  TYPE OF RULE 
[ 
STATUTORY  AUTHORITY FOR RULE  RULEMAKING  IMPETUS 
BR/KI  r D~ON  OF THE RULE 
IL  OVERALL  IMPACT 
I WIM tim r~le lump  m  f:mp~'t em *1~,  eceaemy ~r  $10o ~llllmt  or man?  Yes  Ne 
Yes 
Best "~"-~  ~r  tbe ps'umst value d  qusn~btble bewdSts dldse rule.  S 
Best "d~k~'~ Ot  the Iml~  ~lue d  qusntifl~ds cesgs ~r  tJbe ruJe. ss  S 
Do tin qusntJffslde  ~  outwdtb the ~  c~esT 
Repert the d4~m"  yesr or~ ad  cuts. 
Repeet the d~cout rate meal to cakubh the best esdmste of besuls taxi cmu. 
it  more auut me dbcount r~e wm used bl edcubflom, plesse ~-~l.. wl~. 
No 
INscess levd of  ¢c~dmce il tire ~  at~mtes md key mtcertsbak~ ~..4.,~e  m 
rmtp Jm" he,eats md ceets. 
Id~  ~  or c~ds ~stt went  not ci~,,.~med  sad ~  wl~ they were hue qus~USed. 
85.  "Costs" ere defined e~ costs minus cost savin~ / 
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HI. BENEFITS AND COST8 
F~"  ~ ~: [acnmmtM 
!. ~  and br~kdown of' q---dla.bJe batefthJ by type. 









2. Gtve 8 brier descrllpelan dwho  wm ~ 
K,s~h---~'d  lnar  t~ental Costs 
1. CNts sad be.takdown ef q.---,,,,ms-~ c,Bts by rTpe. 




Ad~emUve  Costs 
Yederml ~  Cm 
Loca~U~  Budg~ Comm 
OU~r C~ 
Notes: 
?.. Give a  bi'llef' descrlpUem edr  who will bear Jbe casls. 
Prtsmt Vdse 
IV. ALTERNATIV]F~ TO "1"~ REGULATION 
I. List mini Imleff~' damd~  ~  Mknmmllvez  to lira nd~ tlhJt  w~  qmmidezml m~l wl~ tlWy 
were reJe¢~l, bzcJ~q~ s  mmmary dcmlh* m~l Izmel~ of ~  Mtern~veL Ifm  Mira,m- 
tires ware c,~,rL4.,-ed, expbdm wb7 not. 2000]  REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY  953 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix is divided into two parts.  The first part provides defini- 
tions for the categories used in reviewing Federal Register notices so that 
scoring can be replien~d if desired. The second part provides a discussion 
of information on other categories that were examined. 
I.  G~Y oF CATEGORIES 
The glossary is divided into the following sections: Alternatives; Costs, 
Cost  Savings,  and  Ben~;F~; Cost-Only  Categories;  Cost  Savings-Only 
Categories, Benefit-Only Categories; Costs and Benefits; Quantitative De- 
tails, Other Impacts, and; Other Details. 
IL  Alternatives 
Notice said alternatives  were discussed:  An agency only had to ~tate in 
the Federal Register notice that altmm~ves were considered.  It did  not 
have to specify those altcnmivcs or discuss them. 
Alternatives discussed:  The agency had to desmibe briefly the altema- 
five(s). 
Alternatives quamifle~ The agency had to  report cost and/or benefit 
numbers for the altem~ve(s). 
B.  Costs, Cost Savings,  and Benefits 
In this section, the phrase "cost/cost  savings~benefits"  ,~f~rs to three 
distinct __  _eo~,3_ olias of cost, cost savings, and benefits, l~e.h of  these catogo- 
ties is scored separately on the variables discussed below. 
Costs: Anything that the asency stated was a cost was considered to be a 
cost. 
Cost Savings: lfthe agency stated that the esthn~t~ was a cost saving or 
a saving, then it was considered to be a cost saving. 
Benefits:  Anything the agency stated was a benefit was considered to be 
a benefit. 
Notice said costs~cost savings/benefits  were assessed: ]he agency had to 
ft~  in the Federal Register notice that costs/co.qt savings/benefits were as- 
sessed.  However,  it  did  not  b_ave to  state  the  actual costs/cost  sav- 
ings/benefits or discuss them. 
Reported costs~cost savfng~beneflts:  The agency had to provide some 
assessment  of the  costs/cost savings/benefits of the  rule in the  Federal 
Register notice.  The estimates did not have to be memorized. 
Monetized  costs~cost  sa~n~/beneflts  reported:  Monetized  costs/cost 
savings/benefits were t~ported when the agency published dollar estimates 954  ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW REF1EW  [52:3 
of  the costs/cost savlngs/benefits,  in the Federal Register notice. 
Costs~cost savings~benefits monetlzed and itemized: The agency had to 
provide  dollar  estimates for  costs/cost savings/benefits  and  publish  a 
breakdown of  these monetized estimates. 
C  Cost-Only Categories 
This paper divides costs int~ a number of categnrlas: private sector com- 
pliance,  budgetary, administrative, local  or state government and  other 
costs.  These categories are not mutually exclusive. Agencies rarely desig- 
nated a c~tegory explicitly.  The following definitions were used in scoring 
costs" 
Priwlte sector compliance costs: Costs inennr~l by the private sector in 
complying with the role. 
Budgetary  costs: Costs incuncd by the federal government in enacting 
the vale. 
Administrative  costs: Costs, like  paperwork,  that were incurred  in ad- 
ministering  rite requirements of  the role. 
Local or state government costs: Costs in,ned by local and state gov- 
ernments in c~nplying or enforcing the rule. 
Other costs: Any other costs the rule imposed. 
D.  Cost  Sa~ngs-Only  Categories 
• Like the ~'~gofies for costs, the categnfies for cost savings are not mu- 
tually exclusive. Agencies rarely designated a  catagmy explicitly.  The 
following definitions we~ used in scoring enst savings: 
Compliance  cost savings:  Cost savings  from  t~lucing private  sector 
enmpliaace costs. 
Budget cost savings: Cost savings obtained from a reduction  in budgnt 
outlays. 
Savings from fuel or energy efficient. Cost savings that mrose from the 
rule increaclng fuel or energy efficiency. 
E,  Benefit-Only Categories 
Benefits are divided into a number Of categories:  pollution, health, other 
environmental and other benefits. These categories are not mutually exclu- 
sive. Agencies rarely designated a ¢~t~$ory explicitly.  The following deft- 
nitiom were used in scoring benefits: 
Pollution  benefits: Classified as benefits from reducing any kind of pol- 
lution. 
Health benefits: Benefits from reducing morbidity and mortality. 
"Other" benefits for the environment:. Any other environmantsl  benefits 2000]  REGULATORY  ACCOONTABILITY  .  955 
resulting from the rule and included any benefits to the environment other 
than pollution benefits.  An example would be wetlands preservation. 
Other benefits:  Any other benefits resulting from the rule. 
Source of benefits unclear:  The seuroe was unclear because  the Federal 
Register notice was unclear. 
F  Costs and Benefits 
Notice states that benefits  exceed costs: The agency had to ~  in the 
notice that the benefits  ex__~_  ~  the mats.  An independent assesm~eat 
was not conducted of whether the agency's reported benefits outweighed 
the mats. 
Monetized cost and benefit estimates reporte~.. The agency had to pro- 
vide dollar estimates for both benefits and costs. 
Monetized costs and benefits,  cost savings and benefits,  or costs and cost 
sm,/ngs: The asency had to provide dollar estimates for one of these com- 
binations of  costs, cost savings and benefits. 
Mbnetlzed and itemized costs and benefits,  cost soWngs and benefits,  or 
costs and cost s  m,  lngs:  The agency hpA to provide dollar estimates  and 
breakdowns of  those est~nates for one of  these combinations of costs, cost 
savings and benefits. 
Prohibited from  considering  costs  and benefits:  Scmet~ns  agencies 
were legally prohibited from considering or calculafin  8 cost and benefit es- 
timates dorin  8 the regulatory process.  An agency needed to state in the 
Federal Register notice that a statute or law prohibited a cost-benefit anA!y- 
SIS. 
G.  Quantitative  Details 
Notice revealed that rule applies to more than one year. This category 
w~ satisfied if  the agency stated that the role applied to more than one year 
or if  the estimates were broken down over multiple years. 
Discount rate reported:  Self-evident. 
Present w~lue of  costs and or benefits  reported: The agency had to state 
specifically that the estimate was in present value terms. 
Dollar year reporte~.  The agency had to report the year the cost and/or 
benefit estimates were in. 
Annual estimates of costs and/or benefits:  The cost and/or benefit esti- 
mates were reported in annual numbers. 956  AD~RATIVE  LA W REVIEW  [52:3 
H.  Other Impacts 
Assessed  paperwork impacts: The agency hnd to say that paperwork ~w~. 
pacts  were  assessed  according  to the  Paperwork  Reduction Act.  The 
ageaey could state that them was or was not an impact.  It could also 
that the nature of  the rule meant it did not have to assess those impacts be- 
cause it did not apply. 
Assessed local and state government impacts: The agency had to say it 
assessed the impact on local and state govemmmts aemrding to the Un- 
funded Mandates Reform Act.  The agency could ~ta~ that there wan,or 
was not an impact.  It could also state thnt the n~,re of the rule meant it 
did not have to assess  those impacts bee~,~ it did not apply. 
Assessed small business impact:. The agency had to say it conducted a 
Reg,  latnry Flexibility An~!ysis to assess the impact on small b-~n~esscs. 
The agency could ~t~ that there was or was not so impact.  It could also 
state that the nature of  the rule meant it did not have to assess those impacts 
because it did not apply. 
1.  Other Details 
Transfer Rule: A rule was  judged a transfer if its primmy impact was on 
federal budget payments.  Examples of  transfer rules ate the Medic;ere and 
sQcial security regulations that change levels of  payment ficnn taxpayers to 
recipients.  They differ systematically from non-transfer rules in ~  they 
do not impose direct social costs upon society. 
RIA Develope~.  An RIA is a regulatow  impact analysis.  The agoney 
obtained credit for the r~te$ory if it stated in the Federal Register notice 
that an RIA was produced. 
lI.  OTHI~ DATA 
This section is divided into a discussion of data related to regulatory im- 
pact analysis, costs, cost savings, benefits, benefits and costs, application of 
rules to more than one year, and assessment of  other impacts. 
A.  MAs 
The expectation was that transfer rules would have a lower percentage of 
RIAs than non-transfer  rules because closer  scrutiny would be given  to 
non-transfer rules.  The a.t~  support  this  view.  Si~y-eight  percent  of 
transfer rules and eighty-nine percent of  non-transfer rules have RIAs.  Ten 
of  the rules included the RIA with the Federal Register notice. 2000]  REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY  957 
No-R/A 
Nmmb~ oJ"  kTma/Ru/a 
Dat~ase 
Ageacy DevelolPcd an RIA 
AH  Non-  Transfer  RIll 
Ra es etv/  
72  38  34  .57  15 
57  34  23  57  0 
79%  89%  68%  100%  0% 
B.  Cost Categories 
As expected, the percentage of roles for which the agency reported cost 
~ates  for private sector compliance costs was much lower for transfer 
than non-U',msfer  rides and the budgetary costs were higher for transfer 
th~n non-a-mL~fer rules.  This is because transfer rules tend to affect the 
budget and non-transfer rules typically have a direct impact on the private 
sector.  Relatively few notices reported information pertaining to adminis- 
tr~ive costs, local and ~t~ government cost and other costs. 
'~  - Tnmsf~ !  "  AH  Non-  RIA  No-RIA 
'Namber of  l~al Rules IR tke ; Rules  Transfer, 
D~.l,  ase  72  38  34  57  15 
I  I  I  I 




Local I Sta/e Goverament 
Costs 
Dther Costs 
27  24 
38%  63% 
21  6 
xg.   t6% 
13  7 
18%  18% 
7  4 
10°~  11% 
2  1 
3%  3% 
3  27  0 
9%  47%  0% 
15  18  3 
44%  32%  20% 
6  11  2 
18%  19% !  13% 
i 
3  7  :  o 
9%  12%  0% 
1  2  0 
3%  4%  0% 
C.  Cost Savings Categories 
Notices indicated that only non-transfer rules had compliance cost 
savings or savings from fuel or energy efficiency,  in addition, more trans- 
fer rules had budget cost savings than non-transfer rules. 958 
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Aft  Non-  Transfer  RIA  No-RIA 
,  •  I  I  I 
72  38  34  57  "15 
Cost Savin~s  Cateeories Re. 
~,rted 
~.ompHance Cost Savings 
Budget Cost Savings 
5avinp From Fuel or Energy 
gffu:kacy 
6  6  0  6  0 
8%  16%  0%  11%  0% 
8  3  $  7  1 
11%  8%  lS%  12%  7% 
3  3  0  $  0 
4%  8%  !  0%  ,S%,  0%  ,  , 
D.  Be.e3~ts 
All but one of the rules without ~n RL~ did not report b~eflts whenms 
tw~ty-six of the ml©s with RL~ reported  at least  some kind of" benefit. 
This result was expected  because rides with RL~s are more likely to at- 
tempt to assess benefits.  All of the pollution and health bc=efits were re- 
ported by the nan-U'ansfer  rule.s: nine (24%) and eleven (29%) respectively. 
"Other"  Benefits  for the  environment  included  environmantal  be~Xtt~ 
other than pollution reductions (e.g., ~ebuilcllng of  the fish stock). 
~m,~bev  of  ~t  l~da in 
Poh'u~on Benefits 
Heidlth Benefits 
~the~  Benefits for the 
Environment 
Other Benefits 
Senn:e of Benefits Uncle~ 
i  AH  Non-  Tram  fro.  R/A 
i  l~,~  Trms.~zr. 
No-R/A 
9  9  0  9  0 
13%  24%  0%  16%  0% 
11  11  0  11  0 
15%  29%  0%  19%  0% 
3  2  i  $  0 
4%  5%  3%  S%  0% 
7  2  S  6  1 
10%  5%  15%  11%  7% 
1  0  1  1  0 
1%  ~  0%  3%  ,2%  0% 
72  38  34  57  15 
i 2000]  REGULATORYACCOUNTABllJ1T  959 
E  Benefits and Costs 
Only four of the rules were prevented by statute from considering costs 
and benefits when making rc~mlato W decisions.  Those four roles explicitly 
stated that they were prohibited fTom considering costs and benefits and 
anything beyond what was established by the authorizing statute.  How- 
ever, there were many other rules than did not assess costs and benefits, but 
whether or not they were prohibited by statute could not be determined 
from the Federal Register. 
Number of  F'mal RulEs in 
Database 
Proh~ited from Considering 
Benefits and Costs 
AH  Now 
'Rules t  Trm'asf~ 
72"  38 
4  4 











F.  Monetiza#onandltemizationofCosts,  CostSavingsandBenefits 
For costs,  cost savings and  benefits there were  a  significantly lower 
number of roles that provided an itemized astimate.  An even lower numtier 
of roles provided monetized and itemized estimates for costs and benefits, 
cost savings and benefits or cost and cost savings. 
I  ~lumber of  FmalRM~ in t.ke 
Database 
ll2osts 
Costs Monetized  ! 
Costs Monetized and Item* 
ized 
!Cost Savings 
Cost Savings Monetized 
Cost Savings Monetized and 
Itemized  [ 
All,  Non-  Transfer  RIA'No-RIA 
I Rul~s i Tramfer I  I  I 
I  72  I  38  I  34  I  $7  I  1S 
39  23  16  36  3 
54%  61%  47%  ,63%  20% 
20  15  t  5  19  :  1 
28%  39%  15%  33%  7% 
I  I  I  I  ! 
14  9  5  13  1 
19%  24%  15%  23%  7% 
tsi 13  ,5,0  ,%5%  ,%,,%,°% 960 
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A//  Non-  Transfer  R/A  No-R/A 
Rules  Transfer 
knefi~s 
Beu~ts Manefized 




5ione/ized Costs and Bene- 
[its, Cost Savings and Bene- 
[its or Costs and Cost Savingj 
112o  Co  San  and 
IS  11  4  IS  0 
21%  29%  12%  26%  0% 
I  8  I  6  I  2  I  8  i  0 
I  11%  I  16%  I  6%  114%1  0%  I 
l!  i  7  4  11  0 
IS%  t  18%  12%  19%  0% 
Monetized and Itemis~l 
Costs and Benefits, Cost 
Savings and Benefits or Costs 
and Cost Savings  6  s  1  6  I  o 
8%  ,  13%  i  3%  II1%i  0% 
G.  Application to more than one year 
For some of the rules, it was clear from the notices that th¢y applied to 
more than one year.  There were more non-transfer rules that applied to 
more than one year -  twenty-seven (79%) than transfer rules.  This can be 
explained  by  the  fact that  regulatory rules  (e.g.,  those  involving  non- 
Uansfers) typically apply to several years whereas budgetary rules may ap- 
ply to a single year.  Many more rules with RIAs than rules without R/As 
were relevant for more than a year.  Most rules without RIAs were unclear 
as to when the rule was applicable. 2000]  .  REGULATORY  ACCOUNTABILI77  961 
i  .  _ 
I  J  All  '  Non-  Transfer  RIA  No-RL4 
I Sules i  ansI ,[ 
base  ~  72  38  34  $7  i  1.5 
[VR ~-o~ ~evcaled that rule  I  I  I  I  I 
applies to more than one year  41  27  14  38  3 
57%  71%  41%  67%  20%  I 
Unclear  if  the rule applies to  I 
more than one year  22  8  14  11  11 
131% I  21%  I  41%  119%j  73%  ) 
H.  Assessment of Other Impacts 
A large fraction of the notices said that the rule assessed impacts for pa- 
perwod~, local and state governments and small businesses.  The biggest 
difference between categories was those with RIAs and those without.  As 
expected those without R1As assessed other impacts less fi~ue~fly than 
those with RIAs did.  There were not large differences between transfer and 
non-tra~fer rules. 
t  All  ~  Non-  Transfer  RIA  No-RL4 
I Rules [T~f~  I 
[Number of l~da in the Dato.  ]  [ 
base 
[Rules  hat assessed  a  r-  [  72  [  3&  I  34  [  37  [  15 
work impacts  66 
94% 
Agency  found an impact  53 
80% 




35  31  53  13 
97°/0  91%  95%  93°/, 
30  23  44  9 
86o/0  74%  83% !  69% 
5  8  9  4 
14%  26%  17%  31% 
2  0  1  I 
!  j  3  131  ! 
Rule not applicable to act 
Dtd not assess impact 
! J 
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All  Non-  Transfer RIA  No-RIA 
!  !  I Ru~  t T~/~  j 
rl~u~ that assessed state ~d"  "  " 
local  vemmmt"  s  $2  27 
83%  79% 
25  44 
86%  85%[ 
7  19  ! 
28%  43% 
18  2S 
72%  S7% 
Agency found an impact  19  12  • 
37%  44% 
Agency found no impact  33  IS 
63%  S6% 
:  Rule not applicable to ac!  9  4  S  S 
I  DM not assess pnpac!  11  7  4  8 
)Rules th~  !  I  ,  i  I  , 
[  SS  31  24  48 
' 93%  94%  92%  96% 
I 
31  18  13  i  31 
56%0  58%  54%  65% 
24  13  11  17  , 
44%  42%  46%  3S% 
13  S  8  7 
4  2  2  2 
I  n  I  !  J 
bus~ness impact 
Agency found an impact 
Agency found no impact 
Rule not applicable to act 
Did not assess impact 
8 
73% 
0 
0% 
8 
100% 
4 
4 
7 
78% 
0 
0% 
7 
100% 
6 
2 